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CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
ACT AND EMINENT DOMAIN: FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH CEQA AS A DEFENSE
TO CONDEMNATION
[Their] ideology gave primacy to the denatured and dehumanized envi-
ronment in which the new technological complex could flourish without
being limited by any human interests and values other than those of
technology itself. All too soon a large portion of the human race would
virtually forget that there had ever existed any other kind of environ-
ment, or any other alternative mode of life.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the rapidly increasing degradation of the environment
by a continually expanding technology, Congress in 1970 enacted the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 Shortly thereafter, the
California Legislature followed with the enactment of the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).3 The policies behind both NEPA
and CEQA are similar in that they seek to provide every person
with a habitable and comfortable environment in which to live and with
opportunities to participate in the decision-ngaking processes of the
agencies responsible for preserving environmental integrity.4 These
1. L. MUMFORD, THE MYTH OF THE MACHNE: THE PENTAGON OF POWER 24 (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 432147 (1970).
3. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 21000-174 (West Supp. 1975).
4. NEPA embodies Congressional recognition of man's continuous encroachment
upon his environment. The Act emphasizes that urbanization, industrial growth and re-
source exploitation must be overseen by state and federal governments in order to main-
tain conditions in which man and nature can coexist. Section 4331 states that, in order
to improve and coordinate federal plans, programs, and resources to that end, it is the
responsibility of the federal government to use all practicable means to:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and cul-
turally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degrada-
tion, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heri-
tage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and
variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attain-
able recycling of depletable resources.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
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policies are implemented through affirmative action provisions5 requir-
ing the disclosure of all potential environmental impacts resulting from
a particular project.6
NEPA and CEQA apply to all governmental projects and to all pri-
vate projeQts subject either to governmental approval or substantial
government involvement and which may have a significant effect on
the environment.7 The scope of these acts is such that governmental
projects which require the acquisition of private property through
eminent domain proceedings may also be subject to their disclosure re-
5. The affirmative action requirements of NEPA are found in 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(1970). Therein all agencies of the federal government are required to utilize a syste-
matic approach which will insure an integrated use of natural and social sciences in the
planning and design stages of projects which might have an impact on man's environ-
ment.
6. Federal agencies are required to
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970). The basis of these reports must include discussion and
comment by all appropriate local, state, and federal agencies. In addition, alternatives
to the proposed action must be considered, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(D) (1970).
In California, environmental impact reports are provided for by CEQA:
All state agencies, boards, and commissions shall prepare, or cause to be prepared
by contract, and certify the completion of an environmental impact report on any
project they propose to carry out or approve which may have a significant effect
on the environment. Such a report shall include a detailed statement setting forth
the following:
(a) The environmental impact of the proposed action.
(b) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided if the proposal
is implemented.
(c) Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the impact including, but not lim-
ited to, measures to reduce wasteful, inefficient, and unnecessary consumption of
energy.
(d) Alternatives to the proposed action.
(e) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.
(f) Any irreversible environmental changes which would be involved in the pro-
posed action should it be implemented.
(g) The growth-inducing impact of the proposed action.
CA.. PuB. Ras. CoDE ANN. § 21100 (West Supp. 1975).
7. CEQA by its very terms is made applicable to all projects that governmental
branches will carry out or approve. CAL. PuB. Rs. CODE ANN. § 21100 (West Supp.
1975); see notes 15-16 infra. Thus the limits of private actions that are within the act
are susceptible of delineation. NEPA, on the other hand, is applicable only to major
federal actions and hence presents interpretive difficulties in determining the private
projects, or for that matter all non-federal programs, to which its provisions apply. See
note 6 supra.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
quirements.8 Consequently, there may be considerable interaction be-
tween the eminent domain laws and the disclosure requirements of the
environmental acts.9 Because NEPA and CEQA fail to recognize this
interaction,'0 considerable time, effort, and expense is often expended
in eminent domain proceedings only to discover that a proposed project
cannot be carried out as planned." The major reason for this is that
the condemnor has failed to comply with the disclosure requirements
of NEPA or CEQA. In order to minimize the time and expense in-
volved in eminent domain proceedings, the determination of a project's
environmental impact should be made a condition precedent to the in-
stitution of such proceedings. 12  Furthermore, failure to comply with
the disclosure requirements should be recognized as an affirmative de-
fense in eminent domain proceedings.'"
II. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF CEQA
It is the declared policy of the California Legislature to protect the
environment from any adverse impact from development."4 In an at-
tempt to accomplish this goal, the legislature requires that each proj-
ect15 initiated by a state or local agency, or a project initiated from
8. See note 7 supra; notes 38-48 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 73-93 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 74-75 infra and accompanying text.
11. See text accompanying notes 81-86 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 94-100 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 101-111 infra.
14. CAL. Pun. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 21000-01 (West Supp. 1975) contain declarations
of policy and intent similar to those found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331 (1970). In sum,
California's policy is to develop and maintain a healthful and high quality environment
within the limitations of the presently existing environment. Each citizen has the re-
sponsibility to contribute to preservation and enhancement of the environment. In turn
the government is required to regulate its management of natural resources and to con-
trol development in order to prevent environmental damage. In furtherance of this ob-
jective, governmental agencies are required to develop environmental protection pro-
cedures.
15. (a) Project means the whole of an action, resulting in physical impact on the
environment, directly or ultimately, that is any of the following:
(1) Any activity directly undertaken by any public agency including but
not limited to public works construction and related activities, clearing or grading
of land, improvements to existing public structures, enactment and amendment of
zoning ordinances, and the adoption of local General Plans or elements thereof pur-
suant to Government Code Sections 65100-65700.
(2) An activity undertaken by a person which is supported in whole or
in part through public agency contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of
assistance from one or more public agencies.
(3) An activity involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, li-
cense, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.
(b) Project does not include:
(1) Anything specifically exempted by state law.
(2) Proposals for Legislation to be enacted by the state legislature.
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the private sector which requires state or local agency approval,16 be
analyzed and evaluated in terms of its potential environmental im-
pact.1 7  The appropriate public agency (lead agency)' 8 must conduct
an initial study to determine whether or not the project may have a
significant effect on the environment. 9 Where the government plans
to carry out the program, the agency must prepare the necessary
documents through its own efforts. 20  With regard to a nongovern-
mental project, the lead agency may require the private person to sub-
mit a statement of data and information which will enable the agency
to make its determination.21 If the agency finds, based on the data
statement and its own independent investigation, that no significant im-
(3) Continuing administrative or maintenance activities, such as purchases
for supplies, personnel-related actions, emergency repairs to public service facilities,
general policy and procedure making (except as they are applied to specific in-
stances covered above), feasibility or planning studies.
(4) The submittal of proposals to a vote of the people of the State or of
a particular community.
(c) The term "project" refers to the underlying activity and not to the govern-
mental approval process.
14 CAL. ADM. CoDE § 15037. See CAL. Pun. Rns. CODE ANN. § 21065 (West Supp.
1975) for a general definition of project. See also County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 795, 803-08, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 383-86 (1973).
16. 14 CAL. ADM. CODE § 15061(a)-(b). State or local agency approval is re-
quired in those situations where permits for a building, a zoning variance, or a condi-
tional use are required by local building codes or zoning ordinances prior to the com-
mencement of a project. See, e.g., Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal.
3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972) (involving approval of a conditional
use permit). See notes 41-47 infra and accompanying text. Another example is the
requirement of obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity before approval from
the Public Utilities Commission can be sought. 71 Op. and Orders of P.U.C. 150 (Dec.
No. 77031) (1970). Since most, if not all, private projects require some form of gov-
ernment permit or approval, the reach of CEQA is not limited only to public projects.
17. CAL. Pun. Ras. CODE ANN. § 21100 (West Supp. 1975) (see note 6 supra for
pertinent text); see Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 263,
502 P.2d 1049, 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 771 (1972); 14 CAL. ADM. CODE §§ 15011,
15061, 15141-43.
18. In an attempt to provide an unbiased and neutral review of the environmental im-
pact of a proposed project, the California Legislature provided for "lead agency" review
and investigation. The lead agency is "the public agency which has the principal re-
sponsibility for preparing environmental documents and for carrying out or approving
a project which may have a significant effect on the environment." 14 CAL. ADM.
CODE § 15030. See 14 CAL. ADM. CODE §§ 15064-66 for other applications of the
lead agency principle.
19. Id. § 15080. It should be noted that § 15080 provides that certain projects need
not comply with the initial study requirement if it is part of a class of projects that quali-
fies for a "categorical exemption." For a list of the categorical exemptions see id. §§
15100-116. The criteria for determining whether or not a project will have a signifi-
cant effect are set forth at id. §§ 15081-82.
20. Id. § 15061(a).
21. Id. §§ 15061(b), 15080.
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pact on the environment will result from the project, it will issue a
negative declaration.22 This declaration signifies that any impact the
project may have on the environment is considered to be negligible and
that the project may proceed as planned. 3 In the event that the
agency finds that a significant impact on the environment will result
from the project, the agency is required to prepare an Environmental
Impact Report (EIR).24
In those cases where an EIR is necessary, the lead agency may re-
quire the private person to submit additional data and information
which will aid in the preparation of the final EIR.23 After the requisite
information has been gathered, the agency is required to consider all
22. Id. § 15033.
23. (a) A Negative Declaration shall be prepared for a project which could poten-
tially have a significant effect on the environment, but which the lead agency finds
on the basis of an Initial Study will not have a significant effect on the environ-
ment.
(b) A Negative Declaration must include a brief description of the project as pro-
posed, a finding that the project will not have a significant effect on the environ-
ment, a brief statement of reasons to support the findings, and a statement indicat-
ing who prepared the initial study and where a copy of it may be obtained ....
(d) After making a decision to carry out or approve the project, the lead agency
shall file a Notice of Determination with a copy of the Negative Declaration at-
tached. The Notice of Determination shall include the decision of the agency to
approve or disapprove the project, the determination of the agency whether the
project will have a significant effect on the environment, and a statement that no
EIR has been prepared pursuant to the provisions of CEQA.
Id. § 15083.
24. Id. § 15084 (1973); see note 92 infra for definition of EIRl
25. The preparation of an EIR requires adherence to the following:
(a) If the project is to be carried out by a nongovernmental person, the lead agency
may require such person to submit data and information necessary to enable the
lead agency to prepare the EIR. This information may be transmitted in the form
of a draft EIR. The draft EIR which is sent out for public review must reflect
the independent judgment of the lead agency ...
(b) The content of an EIR is described in Article 9 of these Guidelines. . . . Be-
fore completing a draft EIR . . . the lead agency should consult directly with any
person or organization it believes will be concerned with the environmental effects
of the project. . . . After completing a draft EIR, the lead agency must consult
with, and obtain the comments of, any public agency which has jurisdiction by law
with respect to the project and may consult with any person who has special exper-
tise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Opportunity for comments
from the general public should be provided.
(d) The lead agency shall evaluate comments received from persons who reviewed
the draft EIR.
(e) The lead agency shall prepare a final EIR ...
(f) The final EIR shall be presented to the decision-making body of the lead
agency ...
(g) After making a decision on the project, the lead agency shall file a notice of
action taken on the project. This notice shall be referred to as a Notice of Deter-
mination. Such notice shall include (1) the decision of the agency to approve or
disapprove the project, (2) the determination of the agency whether the project will
or will not have significant effect on the environment, and (3) a statement that
an EIR has been prepared pursuant to the provisions of CEQA.
14 CAL. ADM. CODE § 15085.
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phases of the project before making a final decision.26 In so doing, the
agency must evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of the project on
the environment on both a short-term and long-term basis 1 Alterna-
fives to the project or its location which could attain the basic objectives
of the project must be investigated.2 8 Where changes in design 29 or mit-
igation measures30 can eliminate or reduce to an "insignificant lever' 31
the adverse impact of a project, these alternatives must be seriously
considered irrespective of the fact that they may substantially impede
the attainment of the project objectives or result in increased cost. 2
Moreover, the specific alternative of "no project" must always be evalu-
ated.
3 3
In view of this last requirement, it is evident that plans should not
be finalized until the environmental impact of the project has been de-
termined. 4 If the agency does not issue a negative declaration or if
it cannot find acceptable overriding considerations, the proponent of
the project will have no alternative but to relocate the project to an
acceptable location or abandon the project in its entirety.
5
Although the procedural requirements of CEQA are clearly set
forth, the Act is silent with respect to such important questions as its
scope of applicability and the time for compliance with its require-
ments. Federal decisions interpreting NEPA may be useful in re-
solving these questions. The California courts have recognized that
CEQA is similar in structure and purpose to NEPA. The similarities
are so pronounced that California decisions have uniformly declared
26. Id. § 15143.
27. Id. § 15143(a).
28. Id. § 15143(d).
29. Id. § 15143(b).
30. Id. § 15143(c).
31. The term insignificant level is one of those legal gems which defies precise defini-
tion. However, it appears that when a court reviews the sufficiency of an EIR, the
test to be applied measures whether there has been an adequate balancing of environ-
mental costs against societal benefits. Thus, where the benefits outweigh the costs it
can be said that the impact upon the environment reaches only an insignificant level.
See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972).
32. 14 CAL. ArM. ConE § 15143 (d).
33. Id.
34. In Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049,
104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972), the court found that an "impact report must be specially
prepared in written form before the governmental entity makes its decision." Id. at 263
n.8, 502 P.2d at 1059 n.8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 771 n.8.
35. See Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under
NEPA, 88 HAzv. L. REv. 735, 748-49 (1975) (evaluation of corresponding NEPA sec-
tion reaches same conclusion).
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that judicial interpretation and construction of NEPA will be strongly
persuasive in interpreting CEQA. 0
An analysis of CEQA and the decisional law generated by the Act's
vagaries with respect to the time for compliance and the breadth of the
Act's reach should provide a basis for ascertaining whether or not and
how the environmental laws relate to the eminent domain laws.
A. Scope of CEQA
In analyzing the scope of CEQA, it is necessary to determine the
meaning of "project" as defined by the Act. CEQA guidelines37 pub-
lished by the California Secretary of Resources indicate that a project
is "the whole of an action, resulting in physical impact on the environ-
ment . *..."38 The guidelines further provide that "[w]hen a public
agency plans to carry out or approve a project which may have a sig-
nificant effect on the environment, the lead agency shall prepare en-
vironmental documents . . ... " These requirements are also appli-
cable to private projects for which public agency approval is neces-
sary.
4"
In defining a project as "the whole of an action," a question arises
as to whether or not land acquisition falls within this definition.4 This
question was considered in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Super-
visors.42  In this case of first impression, 43 the court extensively ana-
36. This policy was clearly enunciated in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coast-
side County Water Dist., 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1972), wherein the
court said:
Lastly, we have the help of several decisions. .. by federal courts in construing
the National Environmental Policy Act. (83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. 4331 et seq.) The
federal act became law or January 1, 1970, just a bit short of a year before that
of California. The two statutes are so parallel in content and so nearly identical
in words that judicial interpretation of the federal law is strongly persuasive in our
deciding the meaning of our state statute.
Id. at 701, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 200; see Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8
Cal. 3d 247, 260, 502 P.2d 1049, 1057, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769 (1972); City of Orange
v. Valenti, 37 Cal. App. 3d 240, 246, 112 Cal. Rptr. 379, 384 (1974).
37. 14 CAL. ADrm. CoDE § 15000 et seq. The guidelines are promulgated pursuant
to CAL. PuB. R s. CODB ANN. § 21083 (West Supp. 1975).
38. 14 CAL. ADuM. CoDE § 15037(a) (emphasis added).
39. Id. § 15061(a).
40. Id. For example, when a utility company desires to construct power lines, it must
acquire the Public Utilities Commission certification for such construction. See 71 Op.
& Orders of P.U.C. 150 (Dec. No. 77031) (1970).
41. If the answer to this question is yes, it will not matter whether the acquisition
through condemnation is by a public agency or a private entity. Both must comply with
the requirements of CEQA. See notes 99-105 infra and accompanying text.
42. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
43. Procedurally, the case reached the supreme court on appeal from a denial of a
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lyzed the legislative intent underlying CEQA,4 4 and devoted consider-
able discussion to the scope and parameters of the Act itself. 45 In so
doing, the court stated that CEQA regulates "construction, acquisition,
or other development" 46 of a project, thereby placing acquisition of
property within the scope of CEQA.47
B. Time for Compliance
Projects begin to be "carried out" long before they reach either the
construction or acquisition stage. Environmental planning may thus
begin at the same time project planning and development are being
undertaken. Since acquisition of land represents a strong commitment,
and perhaps an irrevocable one, the dictates of CEQA seem to ration-
ally lead to the conclusion that environmental analysis of the location
is essential before irrevocable commitments or expenditures in respect
to land acquisition are made.48
However, while the scope of applicability of CEQA has now been de-
fined, neither NEPA nor CEQA specifies when environmental impact
studies must commence.49  Those courts which have considered the
writ of administrative mandamus. The dispute concerned the propriety of the granting
of a conditional use permit by the Mono County Planning Commission. Plaintiffs,
members of a class, appealed the issuance of the permit to the Mono County Board of
Supervisors. The Board of Supervisors affirmed the issuance of the permit, whereupon
plaintiffs sought relief in the court of appeal through a writ of administrative man-
damus. Id. at 253, 502 P.2d at 1052, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 764. The action of the Planning
Commission was once again affirmed. The supreme court granted a hearing to deter-
mine the question of whether or not CEQA applies to private activities for which a per-
mit or other entitlement is required. Id. at 252-53, 502 P.2d at 1051-52, 104 Cal. Rptr.
at 763-64. Although the question was narrowly defined, the opinion is replete with dicta
from which has grown the whole of the California environmental law, both procedural
(the guidelines) and substantive (decisional law).
44. Id. at 256-66, 502 P.2d at 1052-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 764-74.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 257, 502 P.2d at 1055, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 767 (emphasis added). The court
stated in full:
The Legislature also evidenced strong concern for the promulgation of standards
by which environmental needs could be regularly included in the decision-making
process. Because of the regular involvement of public entities in the issuance of
permits it would appear that requiring "governmental agencies at all levels to de-
velop standards and procedures necessary to protect environmental quality" neces-
sarily includes not only situations in which the government itself engages in con-
struction, acquisition or other development, but also those instances in which the
state regulates private activity.
Id. at 257, 502 P.2d at 1055, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 767 (emphasis added and citations
omitted).
47. See text accompanying notes 10 1-05 infra.
48. People v. Bosio, 47 Cal. App. 3d 375, 121 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1975).
49. A thorough reading of both acts and the guidelines promulgated thereunder re-
veals nothing more specific than that preparation of these documents must occur at or
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question indicate that the environmental impacts of a project should
be investigated during its decision-making stages.50 In Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee v. AEC,51 a decision concerning NEPA,
Judge Skelly Wright declared:
Compliance to the "fullest" possible extent would seem to demand that
environmental issues be considered at every important stage in the de-
cision making process concerning a particular action-at every stage
when an overall balancing of environmental and nonenvironmental fac-
tors is appropriate and where alterations might be made in the proposed
action to minimize environmental costs.
52
The CEQA guidelines are substantially in accord with this reasoning:
An EIR is a useful planning tool to enable environmental constraints
and opportunities to be considered before project plans are finalized.
EIRs should be prepared as early in the planning process as possible to
enable environmental considerations to influence project program or
design.53
Thus, it would appear that CEQA requires compliance with its provision
prior to any final judicial determination of the propriety of any land
acquisition.
There is also support for the proposition that these environmental
investigations should be completed and a determination of environmen-
tal impact be made therefrom before any action is taken with respect
to the project under consideration. In Environmental Defense Fund
v. Hardin,54 a preliminary injunction was sought to prevent the Secre-
tary of Agriculture from using chemicals in the implementation of a
during the decision-making process or at the earliest possible time practicable. See text
accompanying notes 154-56 infra.
50. Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 529 P.2d 1017, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 249 (1975). Recognizing the gap in the environmental laws with respect to the
proper time for compliance with the environmental study requirements of the acts, public
agencies have attempted to provide guidelines. In a report sponsored by the Energy
Policy Staff of the Office of Science and Technology, it was recommended that utilities
resolve all environmental questions early in the planning process. Further, the resolu-
tion of such questions should be made an integral part of utility planning, and studies
should be conducted well in advance of any attempt to carry out the proposed project.
ENERGY POLICY STAFF, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ELECTRIC POWER AND THE
ENVIRONMENT vii, viii (1970).
51. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
52. Id. at 1118; accord, Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132,
144 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (S.D.S.D. 1971). See
generally Cohen v. Price Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (dictum).
53. 14 CAL. ADM. CODE § 15013 (emphasis added).
54. 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
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fire ant control program. 55 In finding that this program could signifi-
cantly affect the quality of human environment, the court stated:
[NEPA] requires an agency to undertake research during the planning
of its programs that is adequate to expose their potential environmental
impact and to disclose the results of this research to other interested
agencies.5 6
Il. THE INTERACTION OF CEQA AND THE
EMINENT DOMAIN LAWS
Condemnation of private property for a public use is effectuated in
California through eminent domain proceedings. 57  Since CEQA ap-
plies to all development projects which may have a significant effect
on the environment unless expressly exempted from the provisions of
the Act,58 projects which require condemnation of private property
for public use may be subject to the provisions of CEQA.5 9
California law requires that any public, quasi public, or private entity
or person60 seeking to condemn private property for a public use l must
plead in the complaint through which the action is instituted that the
taking is necessary to a public use.62 Necessity is not of constitutional
55. Id. at 1402. The chemical, used almost exclusively as a pesticide for the control
of fire ants, was found to be directly toxic to shrimp, crabs, and other marine animals.
Id. at 1405.
56. Id. at 1403 (emphasis added).
57. CAL. CIrv. CoDE § 1001 (West 1970).
58. 14 CAL. ADM. CoDE §§ 15100-16.
59. See notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text. An exhaustive list of the permitted
uses for which land acquisition might be effectuated through the power of eminent do-
main is found in CAL. CODE Crv. PRO. § 1238 (West 1967).
60. Any person may, without further legislative action, acquire private property for
any use specified in Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure either -by consent
of the owner or by proceedings had under the provisions of Title 7, Part 3 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; and any person seeking to acquire property for any of
the uses mentioned in such Title is "an agent of the State," or a "person in charge
of such use," within the meaning of those terms as used in such Title....
CAL. Crv. CODE § 1001 (West 1970) (footnote omitted). Purely private persons are
thus given a limited right to exercise the power of eminent domain. Judicial interpreta-
tion has indicated that persons seeking to qualify under this section must have authoriza-
tion from the state to have charge of the use for which the condemnation is sought.
Such an interpretation is a judicial emasculation of the section. See Yeshiva Torath
Emeth Academy v. Univ. of S. Cal., 208 Cal. App. 2d 618, 25 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1962);
People v. Oken, 159 Cal. App. 2d 456, 324 P.2d 58 (1958). Where this qualification
is met, necessity must be pleaded and proved. Linggi v. Garovotti, 45 Cal. 2d 20, 286
P.2d 15 (1955).
61. Eminent domain is the right of the people or Government to take private prop-
erty for public use.
CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. § 1237 (West 1967); see CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 19.
62. CAL. CODE Civ. PRo. § 1241(2) (West Supp. 1975).
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magnitude; it is merely a legislative superimposition upon the exercise
of the sovereign right of eminent domain."3
Although a general allegation of necessity is sufficient in a com-
plaint, 4 a condemnor still must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence the necessity of the taking for the proposed use.05 The elements
making up the proof of necessity are threefold: (1) the public neces-
sity of the proposed use to be made of the property taken; (2) the
necessity of the property to be taken for the proposed use; and
(3) that the location of the proposed public project is most com-
patible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.00
It has long been recognized that the determination of necessity rests
with the legislative branch of government or that it may be delegated
by that branch to its public officers.0 7  California has accomplished the
delegation of the determination of necessity through its enactment of
Code of Civil Procedure section 1241.08 Therein is given to certain
governmental entities the power to determine, by resolution or ordi-
nance, that the taking is necessary for the use sought to be conducted
on the property taken. 9 It is further provided by section 1241 that
in the case of certain enumerated entities,70 their resolution or ordinance
will be conclusive evidence of the necessity of the proposed project,
63. See id.
64. Linggi v. Garovotti, 45 Cal. 2d 20, 27, 286 P.2d 15, 19 (1955) (holding that alle-
gations in a complaint by a private person that the exercise of eminent domain was nec-
essary to abate a nuisance was sufficient to state a cause of action).
65. Id. A somewhat lesser standard of proof is envisioned for public or quasi-public
entities than for persons or entities utilizing the provisions of CAL. CIv. CODE § 1001
(West 1970). See, e.g., Slemons v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 252 Cal. App. 2d 1022,
1027, 60 Cal. Rptr. 785, 788 (1967) (there must be a prima facie showing the necessity
of the taking and the burden of such a showing is upon the plaintiff). See also, CAL.
CODE CIV. PRO. § 1241(2) (West Supp. 1975).
66. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1241(2) (West Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
67. The Supreme Court in Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700
(1923), stated:
The necessity for appropriating private property for public use is not a judicial ques-
tion. This power resides in the legislature, and may either be exercised by the legis-
lature or delegated by it to public officers. . . . "That the necessity and ex-
pediency of taking property for public use is a legislative and not a judicial question
is not open to discussion. .. .
Id. at 709, quoting Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U1.S. 668, 678 (1923); see People
v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 307, 340 P.2d 598, 601 (1959) (declaring that even in
the case of fraud or abuse of discretion the necessity issue could not become justiciable).
See generally McIntire, "Necessity" In Condemnation Cases-Who Speaks for the
People?, 22 HAsTins L.J. 561 (1971); Comment, The Justiciability of Necessity in Cal-
ifornia Eminent Domain Proceedings, 5 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 330 (1972).
68. CAL. CODE Cirv. PRO. § 1241 (West Supp. 1975).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 1241(1).
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the property sought to be taken, and the compatibility of the project
with the greatest public good and least private injury.71 In instances
where the application of the conclusive evidence rule is appropriate,
the issue of necessity becomes nonjusticiable.
71
A. Lead Agency Approval of Location as an Element of Proof of
Necessity in Eminent Domain Proceedings
Compliance with CEQA appears to be directly related to the proof
of necessity in eminent domain proceedings. Until the agency has
passed upon the propriety of the proposed location, a condemnor can-
not prove that his project is planned and located in a manner most com-
patible with the greatest public good and least private injury.
7
The interaction of the environmental requirements of CEQA and
proof of necessity in eminent domain proceedings has created an
anomalous situation. There is no provision in CEQA requiring a de-
termination of environmental impact prior to a final judgment in emi-
nent domain proceedings.74 Conversely, there is no provision in the
eminent domain laws which requires that a determination of environ-
mental impact be conducted and concluded prior to final judgment.75
Thus, a court in determining necessity may conclude that a project's
location is compatible with the greatest public good and least private
injury, while a lead agency may decide the location is environmentally
detrimental. Although the court's analysis of location is predicated on
different considerations from that of the lead agency, the decision of
one inhibits the efficiency of the other in implementing a public project.
Several problems may arise where the superior court in a condemna-
tion proceeding resolves the issue of necessity and the location element
inherent therein prior to an agency's determination17 of environmental
71. Id.
72. See note 67 supra. Although throughout the balance of the article compliance
with CEQA will be discussed as a precondition to condemnation, it should be apparent
that this precondition can be broken down into two subconsiderations. Where the con-
demnor is without the benefit of the conclusive evidence doctrine, compliance with
CEQA must be considered as an affirmative defense raised in the answer in connection
with the necessity defense. Where the conclusive evidence doctrine applies thus making
the necessity issue nonjusticiable, compliance with CEQA must be viewed as a condition
precedent to condemnation apart from the necessity considerations.
73. CAL. CoDE Civ. PRo. § 1241(2) (West Supp. 1975).
74. See CAL. Pun. R.s. CODE ANN. §§ 21000 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
75. See CAL. CoDE Crv. PRo. §§ 1237-67 (West Supp. 1975).
76. See id. § 1241.
77. See text accompanying notes 25-35 supra.
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impact. Where the court permits acquisition to begin prior to this
determination, the lead agency is placed in an untenable position.
The condemnor will have acquired property for the construction of a
public project at a substantial cost. If the agency now determines that
adverse environmental effects will result from the planned construc-
tion, the condemnor may be forced to abandon the project at a substan-
tial cost.78  In order to avoid this situation, an agency might sum-
marily ratify the project irrespective of adverse environmental effects. 79
Where the agency does not choose to ignore the adverse environ-
mental effects, it may order the relocation or abandonment of the
project.8 0  The superior court8l will have determined as a prerequisite
to the acquisition of the property that the project is planned and located
for the greatest public good and the least private harm.82 The agency's
subsequent determination will indicate that the project is not planned
or located for this purpose.83  In so doing, the administrative agency
will have reversed the result reached in the superior court.8 4  The re-
78. See text accompanyiing notes 83-90 inlra.
79. See 14 CAL. ADM. CODE § 15012 which provides in part that:
While CEQA requires that major consideration be given to preventing environ-
mental damage, it is recognized that public agencies have obligations to balance
other public objectives, including economic and social factors in determining
whether and how a project should be approved.
80. The EIR is required to:
[diescribe any known alternatives to the project or to the location of the project,
which could feasibly attain the basic objectives of the project, and why they were
rejected in favor of the ultimate choice. The specific alternative of "no project"
must also always be evaluated, along with the impact. Attention should be paid
to alternatives capable of substantially reducing or eliminating any environmentally
adverse impacts, even if these alternatives substantially impede the attainment of
the project objectives, and are most costly.
Id. § 15143(d).
81. The superior court has fundamental jurisdiction of eminent domain proceedings.
CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1243 (West 1972).
82. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1241(2) (West Supp. 1975); notes 57-66 supra and
accompanying text.
83. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
84. Remedies may be available to the property owner in this situation. See Sterling,
Return Right for Former Owners of Land Taken By Eminent Domain, 4 PAC. L.J. 65
(1973) (discussing in great detail the problem of returning previously condemned land
when a determination has been made that the public use sought to be conducted thereon
cannot be carried out. Id. at 75-116). In Seadale Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971), a condemnor was allowed to acquire a strip of land
prior to obtaining the necessary environmental approval. The Florida Supreme Court
held that if the condemning agency could reasonably demonstrate that the requirements
of the independent environmental agencies could be met and no irreparable damage
would result to the environment from allowing acquisition, condemnees would not be
permitted to attack the condemnation on the grounds of lack of compliance. Id. at 215.
In a concurring opinion, it was suggested that the condemnor should be permitted to
acquire a defeasible fee which would revest in the condemnee in the event the con-
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sult is that a condemnor may be successful in an eminent domain pro-
ceeding only to find that his proposed project cannot be carried out
because it has a substantial adverse impact on the environment.85
In order to avoid this conflict, a condemnor subject to the disclosure
requirements of CEQA should refrain from instituting condemnation
proceedings until a negative declaration8 6 or a final determination of
environmental impact has been issued.s7 A more complete and ra-
tional solution would be to require compliance with CEQA as a pre-
condition to the institution of eminent domain proceedings-a position
which may be supported by a consideration of some of the various as-
pects of CEQA and the eminent domain laws.88
demnor was unable to secure the independent environmental agency's approval. Id. at
216 (Ervin, J., concurring). In light of the discussion that follows, these solutions do
not seem satisfactory. The law seems clear that a condemnor should be entitled to ac-
quire fee simple title, but only after the proper administrative steps have been taken.
See notes 94-100 infra and accompanying text.
85. See 14 CAL. ADM. CODE § 15081.
86. Negative declaration means a statement by the lead agency briefly presenting
the reasons that the project, although not otherwise exempt, would not have a sig-
nificant effect on the environment and therefore does not require an EIR.
Id. § 15033.
87. Environmental Impact Report (EIR) means a detailed statement setting forth
the environmental effects and considerations pertaining to a project as specified in
Section 21100 of the California Environmental Quality Act.
(a) Draft EIR means an EIR containing the information specified in Sections
15141, 15142, and 15143 of these Guidelines.
(b) Final EIR means an EIR containing the information specified in Sections
15141, 15142, 15143, and 15144 of these Guidelines, a section for comments re-
ceived in the consultation process, and the response of the lead agency to the com-
ments received. The final EIR is discussed in detail in Section 15146.
Id. § 15027.
88. A recent California case, People v. Bosio, 47 Cal. App. 3d 375, 121 Cal. Rptr. 495
(1975) refused to consider the question, raised by appellant condemnees, concern-
ing whether or not compliance with CEQA was a condition precedent to continuation
of the condemnation action. Compare Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. Vander-
kloot, 220 N.W.2d 416 (Mich. 1974), where the court found a relationship between
Michigan's environmental laws and the statutory requirement of necessity relative to
condemnation proceedings. In so doing, the court held that the constitutional provision
for the protection of the environment applied to the Highway Condemnation Act. Id.
at 425. The considerations mandated by the Michigan law parallel the alternative con-
siderations of the California law. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. Ulti-
mately it was concluded that the Highway Condemnation Act was not unconstitutional
for failure to provide for synchronization with the Michigan constitutional provisions for
environmental protection. 220 N.W.2d at 430. In reaching this decision, the court held
that, in considering possible locations for highway projects, the Highway Commission
must consider the environmental impacts of such a location. Id. at 428-30. Failure to
do so would render the necessity determination vulnerable to an attack on the basis of
fraud or abuse of discretion. Id. There is no doubt, at least in Michigan, that a deter-
mination of necessity for location of a project without first responding to the environ-
mental protection law is indefensible in the face of an abuse of discretion or fraud at-
tack.
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A similar conflict between a superior court's power and an adminis-
trative agency's power was considered in Northwestern Pacific Railroad
Co. v. Superior Court. 9 There the City of Eureka was seeking to con-
demn a right of way which would require the relocation of petitioner's
railroad tracks." It was held that the Public Utilities Commission was
required to determine the viability of the proposed relocation, but no
such determination was made prior to the institution of the condemna-
tion proceedingsY1 In commenting on this situation, Justice Edmonds
stated:
The complaint in the present case clearly states that removal and re-
location of the tracks constitutes an essential part of the relief sought.
There is no allegation that approval of the commission has been ob-
tained for such relocation. Orderly procedure and justice indicate that
the approval of the Public Utilities Commission should precede exercise
of jurisdiction by the court in a condemnation action requiring reloca-
tion of tracks.
This requirement does not take from the superior courts its fundamen-
tal jurisdiction over the subject matter of an eminent domain proceed-
ing. But where such jurisdiction is sought to be exercised in such a
manner as to affect substantially the operation of a railroad, it may only
be exercised after there has been an administrative approval of the
change in use of the railroad's facilities.
92
By analogy, a strong case can be made for the proposition that compli-
ance with CEQA is an essential step in the proof of necessity.93
89. 34 Cal. 2d 454, 211 P.2d 571 (1949).
90. Id. at 456, 211 P.2d at 572.
91. Id. at 458, 211 P.2d at 574.
92. Id. (citation omitted and emphasis added).
93. Although no California court has considered this position, in respect to condem-
nation and environmental laws, several federal cases have adopted this position. In
United States v. 247.37 Acres, 3 E.R.C. 1098 (S.D. Ohio 1971) the United States insti-
tuted an eminent domain proceeding to acquire land for flood control purposes. Id. at
1101. Although funds had been appropriated pursuant to an Act of Congress in 1969,
no contract had been given and no actual construction had been undertaken. Id. The em-
inent domain proceeding was commenced upon the filing of the Declaration of Taking
in December, 1970. Id. In January, 1971, the United States was given the right of imme-
diate possession pursuant to an ex parte order. Thereafter, the defendants, in answer to
the Declaration, raised seven affirmative defenses, one of which asserted that the con-
demnor had failed to comply with NEPA in that no EIS had been obtained from the
Council of Environmental Quality. Id. at 1103-04. The United States made a motion to
strike the answer and all of its defenses. Id. at 1101. In overruling the motion, the court
held that failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of NEPA could be raised
as a defense to a condemnation action and that the substance of this defense must be
decided by the trial court before condemnation could proceed. Id. at 1106. In so doing,
the court noted:
In a nutshell, any federal agency which proposes to do anything which "may" have
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B. Compliance with CEQA Prior to Acquisition of Property
in Eminent Domain Proceedings
The final determination of the propriety of the location must be
made before proof of necessity can be shown. The condemnor's selec-
tion of a final location is dependent upon decisions made during the
acquisition stage of the project.94 In Friends of Mammoth, acquisition
of property was held to fall within the scope of CEQA. 5 A rational ex-
tension of this holding suggests that compliance with CEQA should be a
precondition to land acquisition in eminent domain proceedings. A de-
termination of environmental impact at this early stage of the project
an impact on man's environment... is required to state just what it proposes to
do, what the impacts are felt to be to the environmental agency and invoke its ex-
pertise before anything is done .... The whole purpose of it [NEPAl is to see
to it that the various agencies, before acting, at least obtain the counsel of the ex-
pert in the field.
Id. at 1100 (emphasis added).
In Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972) condemnees whose property
was sought for construction of a major freeway brought an action in federal court to
enjoin further construction on the project. Id. at 1328. Acquisition of land for the proj-
ect was sought pursuant to a condemnation action brought in state court. The federal
court, having found violations of both NEPA's and CEQA's disclosure requirements,
granted the injunction until the condemnors could show that, among other things, the
EIS and EIR requirements had been fulfilled. Id. at 1336-37. In Gibson v. Ruckels-
haus, 3 E.R.C. 1028 (E.D. Tex. 1971), the court reached a conclusion similar to that
in the Keith case. Finding a violation of NEPA, the court ordered the acquisition of
property to cease until compliance with NEPA as shown. Id. These decisions afford
support for the contention that compliance with environmental disclosure requirements
is a condition precedent to bringing a condemnation action and may be raised as a de-
fense where the condemnor has failed to comply.
The only California case analogous to these federal decisions is City of Orange v.
Valenti, 37 Cal. App. 3d 240, 112 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1974), wherein the State of California
leased a building located in the City of Orange from a private concern for use as a state
unemployment office. Id. at 242, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 381. Prior to the opening of the
office, the City of Orange enacted ordinances requiring special parking and conditional
use permits for "public service buildings". Id. at 242-43, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 381-82. An
injunction was sought by the City of Orange to prevent execution of the lease until the
new ordinances were complied with and an EIR has been completed to study the impacts
generated by the increased traffic flow. Id. at 242, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 381. Defendant's
demurrers to all causes of action were sustained by the trial court without leave to
amend. Id. at 243, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 382. In holding that leave to amend should have
been granted as to the cause of action seeking compliance with CEQA, the appellate
court found that leasing a building was a project within the scope of CEQA and that
compliance therewith was necessary. Id. at 247-50, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 384-86. Since
the acquisition of land by the device of a lease must be preceeded by compliance with
CEQA, by analogy, it follows that acquisition through condemnation must also be pre-
ceeded by compliance with CEQA.
94. See notes 48-56 supra and accompanying text.
95. 8 Cal. 3d at 257, 502 P.2d at 1055, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
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could avoid subsequent delays and expenses in the condemnation ac-
tion. This argument is further supported by the California Supreme
Court's decision in Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Commission.00
In that case the court considered the question of whether or not the
annexation of unincorporated property by a city97 was a project within
the scope of CEQA.9 s It concluded that approval of annexation must be
preceded by compliance with the disclosure requirements of CEQA.99
This decision was based on the court's finding that Friends of Mam-
moth requires scrutiny not only of a particular act but also of the whole
project and its ultimate effect on the environment. 100
Compliance with CEQA prior to acquisition of property and to
institution of eminent domain proceedings will avoid the possibility
of a superior court's finding of necessity being reversed by a subse-
quent agency determination. 1 1 Furthermore, the policy of the en-
vironmental acts would seem to require compliance at the earliest pos-
sible date. 10 2  In Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land
Agency, 0 3 the court recognized that proper compliance with NEPA
could alleviate this problem. It emphasized:
[Environmental impact] statements were not to be merely post hoc en-
vironmental rationalizations of decisions already fully and finally made.
Rather their purpose is to ensure "meaningful consideration of environ-
mental factors at all stages of agency decision making," and to inform
both the public and agencies implicated at subsequent stages of decision-
making of the environmental costs of the proposal.' 04
96. 13 Cal. 3d 263, 529 P.2d 1017, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975).
97. Id. at 268, 529 P.2d at 1020, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 252. In Bozung, the City of Cam-
arillo attempted to annex certain unincorporated property. Prior to such action, ap-
proval of a local agency formation commission was required. The duties of such an
agency include, among other things, the approval or disapproval of annexation proposals.
See CAL. GovT. CODE ANN. §§ 54773 et seq. (West Supp. 1975). A private developer
was desirous of constructing a residential development on the property in question and
requested along with the City of Camarillo annexation approval for the subject property.
The agency approved the request without compliance with CEQA. Plaintiffs, as resi-
dents and taxpayers of the city and county, brought the action seeking a writ of man-
damus and declaratory relief. The basis of their action was that the agency was required
to comply with CEQA prior to approval.
98. 13 Cal. 3d at 278-79, 529 P.2d at 1027-28, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 279-81, 529 P.2d at 1027-29, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60.
101. See text accompanying notes 76-85 supra.
102. See notes 48-56 supra and accompanying text.
103. 499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
104. Id. at 511, quoting Scientist's Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481
F.2d 1079, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1973). California has also recognized this problem by pro-
viding that "[a]n EIR may not be used as an instrument to rationalize approval of a
project. . . ." 14 CAL. ADM. CODE § 15012.
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The California Law Revision Commission is also of the opinion that
compliance with the environmental laws of the state may have a bearing
on the question of necessity. 1 5 In preparation for a total revision of
eminent domain laws, the Commission has been making extensive
studies of the provisions relating to necessity. 1 6 The Commission has
recognized that compliance with the requirements of CEQA may be
an essential step in the proof of necessity and a condition precedent
to a condemnation action. 107 The Commission stated:
[Tihe prerequisites to condemnation specified in Section 1240.030 may
not be the only prerequisites for public projects. Environmental state-
ments and hearings may be required by statute, relocation plans may be
required, or consent of various public agencies may be required. The
public necessity elements of Section 1240.030 supplement but do not
replace any other prerequisites to condemnation imposed by any other
law.10
8
Nichols, in his respected treatise on eminent domain, takes the posi-
tion that failure to comply with the environmental acts casts serious le-
gal doubt upon the validity of the taking. °9 He further emphasizes
that the environmental acts have a direct impact upon the exercise of
the power of eminent domain in noting:
Principal among the procedures [of environmental acts] is one re-
quiring the filing of an environmental impact statement in connection
with any major action, indicating the ramifications of the proposed
course of action with respect to the environment. This would appear to
include any sizeable project involving condemnation. . . and failure to
file an environmental statement would appear to render the validity of
the taking open to serious legal question. 110
105. 1974 CALIF. LAW REVISION CoMMIssION, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION RE-
LATING TO CONDEMNATION LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE EMINENT DOMAIN LAW §
1240.030, at 97-98 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION].
106. See generally id. at 5-6.
107. See generally id. § 1240.030, at 97. Furthermore, before the power of eminent
domain could be exercised, the new code provisions would require all those seeking to
exercise such power to obtain a resolution of necessity (id. § 1245.220, at 144) which
would contain a declaration that "[t~he project is planned or located in the manner that
will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury." Id.
§ 1245.230, at 144-45. Given the discussion accompanying notes 73-93 infra, one
can imply that this resolution should follow the final decision of the lead agency on the
environmental questions.
108. TENTATIvE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 105, § 1240.030 at 98 (citations
omitted).
109. 7 P. Nicuots, THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. Supp. 1973).
110. Id. at § 14.04. A contrary conclusion was reached in Concerned Citizens
United, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 523 P.2d 755 (Kan. 1974). There, owners
of property needed by defendant for construction of a power plant sought to enjoin con-
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These authorities suggest that compliance with CEQA is necessary
before the location element inherent in the question of necessity can
be proved. Since the court's judgment in eminent domain proceedings
must await such compliance, it is advisable to refrain from instituting
proceedings until the final determination has been made.111
demnation of their land until the defendant obtained necessary state and federal permits
and until compliance with state and federal laws could be shown. Id. at 758. The pri-
mary thrust of the land owners' argument against the condemnation was that defendant's
activities would cause substantial environmental harm to the surrounding countryside.
Id. at 761. The court first declared that the defendants were lawfully charged with re-
sponsibility for determining that the taking was necessary and that the court would not
adjudicate that question. Id. at 763-64. More importantly, the court found that the
Kansas Legislature intended that compliance with other laws could not be raised by con-
demnees as conditions precedent to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Id.
at 767. It should be pointed out that Kansas had no environmental laws similar to
NEPA and CEQA. Id. Moreover, defendant made extensive studies of all possible en-
vironmental impacts which could result from its proposed project. Id. at 759-61. The
court felt that defendant had adequately explored all environmental impacts and had
taken appropriate steps to mitigate any adverse environmental impact. Id.
The Kansas Power case seems patently irreconcilable with the reasoning of the cases
which have held that compliance with federal and local environmental laws is a condi-
tion precedent to condemnation. Further, in the case of TVA v. Three Tracts of Land,
377 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ala. 1974), the court held that acquisition of title by T.V.A.
was properly determined to not be a federal activity which required the filing of an im-
pact statement. Id. at 638. These cases are clearly contra to the express policy of the
environmental acts and as such should not be followed where an environmental statute
is involved.
111. For a contrary view, see note 110 supra. In Concerned Citizens United, Inc.
v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 523 P.2d 755 (Kan. 1974), it was conceded that the cur-
rent zoning of the property would not permit the use for which the condemnor sought
the property. The court implicitly accepted the Attorney General's argument that,
should a rezoning be denied by the appropriate administrative authority, "then a conflict
would exist between the exercise of the delegated powers of eminent domain and zon-
ing." Id. at 767. Here, then, is presented the same administrative-judicial conflict
raised in the text. See text accompanying notes 73-93 supra. Although the court recog-
nized the conflict, it failed to resolve it. The ultimate resolution of the question was
left to the legislature. This failure to resolve a fundamental conflict allowed the court
to conclude that, in the absence of any express legislative declaration with respect to
zoning as a condition precedent to the exercise of eminent domain, the failure to change
the zoning could not be asserted by condemnees as a defense to the condemnation action.
Id. at 768.
In Seadade Industries, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971),
the court attempted to resolve the question of whether or not independent agency ap-
proval of a project is a condition precedent to exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Id. at 210-11. The court came closer to ultimate resolution than did the Kansas Su-
preme Court by holding that where independent governmental agencies charged with
safeguarding natural resources must ultimately approve a project involving condemna-
tion, the condemning authority must demonstrate a reasonable probability of obtaining
approval. It must also demonstrate that the condemnation will not result in irreparable
harm should the approvals be denied. Id. at 214. This solution, however, still leaves
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CONCLUSION
It is evident that the courts and other authorities have now recog-
nized the potential problems arising from the interaction of the en-
vironmental acts and eminent domain law. However, the provisions
of neither the environmental acts nor the law of eminent domain pro-
vide solutions to these problems. In those situations where condem-
nation of private property falls within the disclosure requirements of
CEQA the most efficient method to avoid delays, increased costs,
and the abrogation of a superior court's ruling is to require full compli-
ance with CEQA prior to the institution of eminent domain proceed-
ings. This could be accomplished if a provision to this effect were writ-
ten into the new eminent domain law.
Sheldon Chernove
unresolved the result of the withholding of agency approval subsequent to condemnation
of the property.
Analogous objections were made to plaintiffs' action in Bozung v. Local Agency
Formation Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 529 P.2d 102, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975) (see
notes 94-100 infra and accompanying text). Basically, the argument was that the re-
quirement of an EIR at this point was premature and wasteful. The court concluded that
it was the initiating act of a project that might significantly affect the environment and
not the culminating act that set the operative sections of CEQA into action. The court
concluded that preparation of an EIR at the earliest possible moment in the planning
stages of a project was necessary. rd. at 282, 529 P.2d at 102, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 262, cit-
ing 14 CAL. ADM. CODE § 15013 (1973). All statutes should be harmonized, (id. at
274 n.7, 529 P.2d at 1024 n.7, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 256 n.7) and the conflicts encountered
in the above cases are, at least in California, resolved in favor of viewing CEQA com-
pliance as a condition precedent to condemnation. It is the intent of the legislature that
the impact of a project upon the environment be studied at the earliest possible moment
in a project's life. When harmonizing that with the power of eminent domain, it is evi-
dent that compliance with CEQA's PIR procedures must be viewed as a condition prece-
dent to condemnation. The exercise of eminent domain is the initiating act of a project
which may have significant impact upon the environment and, under the Bozung analysis
should trigger CEQA's EIk procedures.
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